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 Basel II and the Need for Bank Distress Resolution 
Procedures* 
 
BY  CLAS  WIHLBORG 
 
 
 
 
It is argued that without increased market discipline Basel II is not likely to resolve 
the regulatory problem caused by explicit and implicit guarantees of depositors and 
other creditors of banks. One way to enhance market discipline is to implement 
proposals for mandatory subordinated debt. For these proposals to achieve their 
objective, the non-insurance of holders of subordinated debt must be credible. 
Increased credibility of non-insurance of one or several groups of creditors could 
be enhanced if distress resolution procedures for banks were pre-specified, and if they 
made possible bank failures without serious disruption of the financial system. The 
existence of rules for dealing with banks in distress not only enhances the credibility 
of non-insurance of some creditors, it also allows for predictability of distress 
resolution costs for shareholders and management of banks. Such costs—if predict- 
able—reduce the moral hazard incentives caused by deposit insurance schemes. 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of banks’ internal ratings to determine capital requirements for different 
kinds of loans may  have appeared to the Basel Committee  as the solution 
untying the Gordian knot of regulatory capital requirements. The dilemma 
facing the Basel Committee lies in the assignment of risk weights for different 
kinds of loans when calculating the regulatory capital requirement. On the one 
hand, assigning the same risk weight to a wide variety of loans with different 
risks invites risk arbitrage. Such arbitrage implies that banks tend to favor loans 
with relatively high risk and return among loans with the same risk weight. On 
the other hand, specifying the risk weight in a detailed manner for each type of 
loan renders banks’ expertise in risk evaluation irrelevant for the funding costs 
of different loans. Risk evaluation is supposed to be the basis for banks’ 
competitive advantage in loan markets of different kinds. 
The internal ratings standard under Basel II would ideally strengthen the 
incentives of banks to develop and use risk-evaluation skills in order to enhance 
 
*This paper is based on comments on presentations by Andrew Crockett, Mark Tilden and 
Hyun Shin at a conference on The Future of Banking Regulation organized by the 
Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science, April 7—8, 
2005. The specifics of these presentations will not be addressed, however. 
 
  
  
 
 
their competitiveness. This reasoning presumes either that banks’ risk-taking 
incentives become appropriate or that supervisors are able to monitor banks’ 
risk-scoring systems, as well as their use in credit allocation. However, the 
rationale behind regulatory capital requirements in the first place is that banks 
do not have appropriate incentives as a result of explicit and implicit guarantees 
of depositors and other creditors of banks. Supervisors’ ability to monitor banks’ 
credit allocation is constrained by lack of supervisory capability or capacity, as 
well as by being dependent on banks’ information systems and reports. 
The Basel Committee is well aware of the incentive problems and the limita- 
tions of supervisors. Therefore, the committee has recommended ‘‘expanded 
supervision’’ as Pillar 2 of Basel II, and ‘‘strengthened market discipline’’ as 
Pillar 3. The specifics of these proposals have been developing over the last few 
years of committee work. The more specific the Basel Committee has become 
the stronger are the reasons to doubt that Basel II will achieve its objective. In 
this paper it will be argued that the current Basel II proposals with respect to 
supervision and market discipline seem to defeat the whole purpose of using 
banks’ internal ratings to determine risk weights. 
In section II the concepts of economic and regulatory capital are discussed. It 
is often stated that an objective of Basel II is to achieve equality between these 
two concepts. This objective may lead the debate astray, however. In this section 
the role of distress resolution costs for banks is emphasized as they determine 
banks’ desired capital relative to regulatory capital. The meaning and conse- 
quences of expanded supervision under Pillar 2 are discussed in section III. In 
particular, political economy aspects of expanded supervision are considered. 
Market discipline and Pillar 3 are the subjects of section IV. Finally, in section 
V, it will be argued that enhanced market discipline is required for Based II and 
any other capital adequacy standard to work properly in the sense that it 
enhances the efficiency of the financial system in terms of credit allocation 
and sets the stage for a dynamic development towards  greater  efficiency. 
These objectives require the development of ex ante rules for dealing with 
banks in distress. 
 
II. ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY CAPITAL 
One of the stated objectives of the capital adequacy regime according to the 
Basel Committee is to achieve equality between regulatory and economic capital 
of banks. This objective seems to mean that banks holding capital in accordance 
with regulation would hold an amount corresponding to what the market would 
induce banks to hold if markets were competitive, banks’ creditors were well 
informed, and there were no guarantees of deposits and other claims on banks. 
Under these conditions banks would choose optimal debt-equity ratios and the 
share of equity financing of an individual loan would depend on the contribu- 
tion of this loan to the probability of bankruptcy for the bank. The equity 
capital of a bank would serve its buffer role for a bank facing risk of its assets. 
 
 
 
Capital adequacy regulation could properly have as its objective to induce 
banks to choose an optimal or at least an efficient capital structure. However, 
this objective is different from saying that the capital required should equal the 
efficient amount of capital. It can be expected that the required capital would be 
lower than the desired capital as well as the economic capital because banks 
would want to hold a buffer above the regulatory requirement. The size of this 
desired buffer depends on the costs for the banks’ shareholders and management 
associated with falling below the required capital. 
The formulation of capital requirements as minimum amounts implies that 
supervisory authorities are expected to impose costs on banks when they fall 
below the required level. If these costs are substantial, one can think of the 
minimum capital ratio as the ratio where bankruptcy de facto occurs and 
bankruptcy costs are incurred. Therefore, banks have an incentive to keep a 
buffer above the minimum capital. The costs of falling below the required 
capital vary from country to country depending on the degree of forbearance 
of supervisors and the ‘‘distress reolution costs’’ supervisors impose. 
The confusion created by the Basel Committee’s terminology refers to impli- 
cations of banks generally holding a statistically larger amount of capital than 
required. The excess capital may be interpreted to mean that capital require- 
ments are not binding. This interpretation is erroneous, however, if there are 
costs associated with insufficient capital relative to the regulatory minimum. 
Interview studies of banks’ potential responses to Basel II are also difficult to 
interpret as a result of the confusing terminology. Tilden (2005) reports on an 
interview study of credit and non-credit financial firms wherein the firms evaluate 
the potential impact of Basel II on competition, risk evaluation procedures, 
regulatory capital levels, and costs and prices of loans. The financial firms gen- 
erally indicate substantial effects on regulatory capital levels and competition in 
the credit markets but little effects on costs and prices. Furthermore, the respond- 
ing firms generally indicate that there will be little impact on them specifically. 
One possible explanation for the seemingly contradictory responses is that 
most banks hold substantially more capital than required. Therefore they 
believe that they are not constrained by regulatory capital. However, they may 
not realize how and to what extent the desired amounts of capital they hold are 
influenced by the regulatory levels through the markets for equity and debt. 
Thus, they may believe that they individually will not be affected while the 
industry will be. 
Once distress resolution costs are considered it follows that such costs 
(associated with falling below the required capital), and the level of required 
capital should be determined jointly within a capital adequacy regime. As it is, 
countries differ in terms of enforcement of capital requirements and costs 
associated with a deficiency of capital. Thus, equal capital requirements across 
countries do not create ‘‘a level playing field.’’ 
A second implication of the view of required capital ratios as trigger ratios for 
distress-related  costs  is  that  the  required  capital  should  be  set  below  the 
  
  
 
 
economic capital. A country imposing ‘‘Prompt Corrective Action’’—as the US 
does at a level of capital above the Basel level of 8%—should perhaps have a 
required capital ratio much below the level other countries apply. 
Another aspect of regulatory relative to economic capital requirements is the 
relative risk weights assigned to different loans. On this issue the objective of the 
use of banks’ internal ratings is to enable banks to assign regulatory risk weights 
in accordance with their true evaluations of economic risk. Thus, assuming that 
supervisors are able to monitor banks’ internal risk-scoring systems it would 
seem that Basel II should be able to achieve equality between regulatory and 
economic capital in relative terms, i.e. in terms of risk weights for different 
loans. Can the relative risk weights imposed by Basel II be binding on the banks 
when the desired amounts of capital lie substantially above the minimum 
regulatory levels? If a bank holds twice the regulatory minimum amount of 
capital, will the share of capital held against each loan be determined by the 
regulatory requirement? 
Consider a situation where a bank’s assets amounting to USD 100 consist of 
two equal size loans, with risk weights of 0.5 and 1.5. Assume that the regulatory 
capital requirement is 8% of risk-weighted assets. 
 
Regulatory capital requirement: 0.08[.5 ·50 þ 1.5 ·50] ¼ 8 
 
The bank chooses to hold capital at a level 12% of risk-weighted assets. This 
level is well above the required level but the risk-weights need not be the same as 
the regulatory weights. Denote the bank’s choice of risk weights in its capital w1 
as w2. Does the bank choose capital for the loans using the formula: 
:12½w1 · 50 þ w2 · 150] ¼ 12; 
or using  
:12½w1 · 50 þ w2 · 150] ¼ X subject to X > 8? 
Using the first formula the weights must clearly be the regulatory weights. In the 
second case the bank may choose different risk weights but the amount of capital, 
X, must exceed the regulatory minimum. In this case the marginal funding costs 
for the two loans is not determined by the regulatory risk weights if X > 8. 
There is a strong incentive for the bank to use the first model for risk weights 
if there are substantial distress resolution costs imposed on the bank when the 
capital reaches the regulatory minimum, and  if the regulatory risk weights 
coincide with the bank’s risk evaluation. On the other hand, if the supervisor 
does not impose substantial costs at the regulatory minimum the bank chooses 
risk weights based on the probability that the capital will be exhausted and costs 
associated with insolvency. In this case the bank’s choice of risk weights is 
subject to moral hazard to the extent that  bank’s  creditors  are  insured.  In 
other words, the regulatory capital requirements are binding only up to the 
regulatory minimum. 
 
 
 
The fact that banks seem to choose levels of capital above the regulatory 
minimum can be viewed as evidence that there are some distress resolution costs 
when the regulatory minimum is reached. It does not follow, however, that these 
costs are sufficient for the bank to choose the regulatory risk weight or weights 
that reflect the bank’s perception of relative economic risk. 
The key issue here is who bears the costs if the capital falls below 8%? Clearly, 
the larger the share of these costs that fall on shareholders and bank managers, 
as opposed to insured depositors and the government, the greater is the like- 
lihood that banks will use the probabilities of loan losses to determine the risk 
weights w1 and w2. Since Loss Given Default (LGD) typically is far greater than 
the average capital held by the bank it can be assumed that the probability of 
default on each loan determines the likelihood that credit loss can be shifted to 
depositors or deposit insurance systems. Since shareholders’ stake is limited, 
distress resolution costs on management may be required for the bank to use 
their actual risk assessment to set risk weights. 
The conclusion of this discussion is that distress related costs imposed by 
corrective action rules are important both for the banks’ choice of capital ratio 
above the required level, and for the relative risk weights banks want to assign to 
loans with different kinds of risk. If substantial distress related costs are 
imposed, banks have an incentive to hold capital ratios above the required 
level and the desired risk weight will be close to those reflecting economic risk. 
On the other hand, if distress related costs are small, banks’ desired capital will 
be close to the regulatory minimum, and banks have incentives to choose risk 
weights that differ from those reflecting economic risk. The need for strict 
supervision of credit scoring systems is therefore great if supervisors do not or 
cannot impose substantial costs on banks that fall below the regulatory capital 
level. 
 
 
 
III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXPANDED SUPERVISION 
UNDER PILLAR 2 
Expanded supervision is proposed by the Basel Committee in order to compen- 
sate for the inherent information advantage of banks with respect to internal 
risk-scoring systems, and to counteract incentives of banks to assign risk weights 
that do not properly reflect the economic risk of loans. 
The issues discussed in this section are based on political economy arguments 
that, taken together, lead to serious doubts about the possibility of Basel II 
achieving its objectives. A first issue having political economy consequences is 
the sheer complexity of implementing an internal ratings based capital require- 
ment regime. This complexity has made the Basel Committee increasingly open 
to ‘‘supervisory discretion.’’ The second aspect of Basel II with political ramifi- 
cations is the deep involvement of supervisors in the validation process for risk- 
scoring systems and their implementation. 
  
  
 
 
The complexity of Basel II has been widely recognized. Although the inten- 
tion of the Basel Committee has been to create a capital standard that can be 
implemented across jurisdictions in such a way that banks compete on a ‘‘level 
playing field,’’ the many dimensions of bank risk make national and bank- 
specific discretion inevitable. 
Two banks with similar loan portfolios in different countries will not con- 
tribute equally to  systemic risk. Bankruptcy laws, rules for  collateral, debt 
recovery procedures, the ability to securitize loans, accounting systems, etc. 
vary across jurisdictions. These aspects of the legal and regulatory systems are 
clearly relevant for the risk banks face on loans. The differences among coun- 
tries provide a logical reason for differences in the application of Basel II rules. 
For example, for a given probability of default on a loan, Loss Given Default is 
likely to be lower in a country with creditor oriented bankruptcy law, and banks’ 
ability to monitor borrowers depend on accounting rules and information 
systems. 
Comparing banks with similar loan portfolios within a country is also not 
without ambiguity. Collateral arrangements may differ across banks, the use of 
other risk mitigation techniques like securitization, credit swap arrangements 
and the like differ as well, and these differences are not captured formally in the 
Basel II rules for risk evaluation. Furthermore, the quality of the risk-scoring 
models is likely to vary across banks. Thus, it is only appropriate that capital 
requirements are adjusted for such factors. 
The problem that arises as a result of ‘‘supervisory discretion’’ is that the 
capital requirements faced by individual banks within a country, as well as the 
national application of Basel II rules, are not determined entirely by ‘‘objective’’ 
risk factors, but also by the subjective evaluation by national supervisors. There 
are simply too many objective factors for the Basel II formulas to capture them 
in estimates of probabilities of default and LGD. 
Supervisory discretion also applies to actions taken when a bank’s capital 
falls below the required limit. Thus, costs of distress vary across countries 
and, as noted in the previous section, they influence the actual  amount  of 
capital banks want to hold. The scope for supervisors’ subjective evaluation of 
banks’ risk taking implies that the objectives of supervisors and the political 
setting they are operating in affect the implementation of the capital adequacy 
rules. 
It has been pointed out by, for example, the European Shadow Financial 
Regulatory Committee1, that supervisors’ important role in validating risk- 
scoring models and their implementation carries with it the danger of ‘‘regula- 
tory capture,’’ as well as the possibility that supervisors will be held politically 
responsible for bank failures. These political economy considerations imply that 
the implementation of Basel II could lead to a strengthening of implicit guar- 
antees of banks. 
 
1   Statement No. 16, 2003. 
 
 
 
‘‘Regulatory capture’’ is a well-known consequence of a close relationship 
between a regulator and regulated firms. It implies that the regulator fails to 
keep an arm’s length relationship with the industry but tends to incorporate the 
interests and objectives of the regulated firms in its own objectives. 
The implementation of Basel II seems to create an almost perfect setting for 
‘‘regulatory capture.’’ Supervisors are expected to be deeply involved with the 
banks when validating and implementing risk evaluation models. The success of 
the national banks under an authority’s jurisdiction reflects positively on the 
supervisor. Thus, supervisors are likely to be reluctant to impose requirements 
that make domestic banks less competitive. Since funding costs increase with 
higher risk assessment for a bank, supervisors in some countries may turn a 
blind eye to internal risk scoring models that underestimate the riskiness of 
banks’ loan portfolios. 
Regulatory capture can also influence the competitiveness of individual banks 
within a country. Relationships between the supervisor and large,  complex 
banks with well-connected managers are likely to be  relatively  close. 
Therefore, forbearance towards such banks is likely to be relatively great. 
The deep involvement of supervisors in critical areas of bank management 
implies that the failure of a bank may be interpreted as supervisory failure in the 
eyes of public opinion and policy makers. This increased political responsibility 
for the health of the domestic banks could induce supervisors to be strict in their 
supervisory role. If so, the dangers of ‘‘regulatory capture’’ would be reduced. 
On the other hand, when a bank approaches distress the supervisor has an 
incentive to show forbearance and to  avoid the imposition  of costs on the 
bank in the hope that the bank can ride out the storm. The supervisor may 
even use political clout to persuade the government to bail out the bank by 
means of more or less obvious financial aid. Of these two effects on supervisory 
incentives the latter one is most likely to dominate. If supervisors have the 
ability to influence the survival of banks, the importance of being strict ex 
ante is reduced. 
These political economy arguments leading to the conclusion that Basel II can 
increase forbearance with respect to risk-taking, would not be present if banks’ 
depositors and other creditors would penalize risky banks with higher funding 
costs. In other words, if banks face market discipline with respect to risk taking, 
the coincidence of banks’ and supervisors’ objectives would induce supervisors 
to favor banks with economically sound risk-scoring and management models. 
Unfortunately, Basel II fails to contribute to the enhancement of market 
discipline. 
 
IV. MARKET DISCIPINE IN PILLAR 3 
The Basel II proposal pays attention to market discipline and its potential 
complementarity with supervision. Market discipline has also received a lot of 
academic attention with research focusing on the potential role of a mandatory 
  
  
 
 
subordinated debt requirement as a device to induce banks to consider the 
impact of risk on market yields on debt instruments isssued by banks.2 The 
yield on subordinated debt could also serve as a market signal to supervisors 
about the riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio. 
The specific proposals of Basel II with respect to market discipline is not likely 
to increase the sensitivity of banks’ funding costs to changes in bank risk-taking. 
The main reason for this assessment is that the proposal is limited to informa- 
tion disclosure. By putting their faith in rules for information disclosure alone to 
create market discipline, the Basel Committee neglects that the amount and 
truthfulness of information available in the market place depend on incentives 
on the demand as well as supply side for information. 
The disclosure of information to creditors, who feel essentially insured is not 
going to have much impact on the relationship between risk-taking and yields 
on banks’ debt instruments. There is little doubt that creditors of banks in most 
countries perceive themselves as insured with a high probability. Even when 
banks issue subordinated debt, the holders of these debt instruments may 
perceive themselves as insured.3 The objective of making subordinated debt— 
issued to specific target investors—a mandatory part of capital requirements is 
that the non-insurance of the instruments should be made credible. 
The Basel Committee has not made subordinated debt a part of Pillar 3. The 
most common  arguments against subordinated debt are that market  partici- 
pants are not likely to be more informed than supervisors under any circum- 
stances, and that markets for debt securities are too thin for yields to be reliable 
market signals. If these are the arguments against the subordinated debt propo- 
sals one wonders why the Basel Committee has given market discipline the 
weight of a Pillar. Market discipline under the current proposal must be pro- 
vided by markets for bank equity alone. However, shareholders provide only a 
small part of banks’ funding and they are subject to the moral hazard problem 
caused by limited liability. 
 
 
 
V. ENHANCING MARKET DISCIPLINE AND DISTRESS RESOLUTION 
PROCEDURES 
It has been argued that without increased market discipline Basel II is not likely 
to resolve the regulatory problem caused by explicit and implicit guarantees of 
depositors and other creditors of banks. This problem is made worse by having 
 
2 See Benink and Wihlborg (2002)  for  information  about  the  large  number  of  proposals 
with respect  to mandatory subordinated debt as a part  of  capital requirements. Empirical 
literature on subordinated debt is also reviewed. 
3 The empirical evidence with respect to the market discipline effects of subordinated debt is 
ambiguous. There is some evidence of such effects in the USA (see, for example Evans and 
Jagtreni, 2004). Sironi (2000) presents European data indicating that  subordinated  debt 
yields are related to banks’ riskiness in spite of the ambiguity with respect to the credibility 
of the non-insurance of the debt in the current regulatory regime. 
 
 
 
shareholders also perceiving themselves as insured to some extent by many 
banks being ‘‘too big to fail.’’ 
One way to enhance market discipline is to implement proposals for manda- 
tory subordinated debt. For these proposals to achieve their objective the non- 
insurance of holders of subordinated debt must be credible. As long as super- 
visors, central banks and governments fear that bank failures are going to be 
disruptive and costly, the incentives to resolve a banking crisis by saving banks 
in distress are strong. There is generally a need for a speedy intervention in a 
banking crisis in order to avoid a bank run and potential contagion effects to 
other banks. Absence of ex ante procedures for resolution of a banking crisis 
implies that authorities must intervene with urgency and without a well-pre- 
pared plan. Such an ad hoc approach often includes the extension of a blanket 
guarantee to all creditors of banks. For these reasons, statements about the non- 
insurance of creditors tend to lack credibility. 
Increased credibility of non-insurance of one or several groups of creditors 
could be enhanced if distress resolution procedures were pre-specified, and if 
they made possible bank failures without serious disruption of the financial 
system. ‘‘Prompt Corrective Action Procedures’’ such as those implemented by 
the FDIC in the USA represent one approach to rule based distress resolution in 
banking. Another approach would be to specify bank insolvency procedures 
taking into account banks’ role in providing liquidity. This liquidity role implies 
that the appropriate insolvency law would be comparable to Chapter 11 in 
American bankruptcy law, allowing temporary protection against creditors 
while normal business operations are allowed to continue.4 
The existence of rules for dealing with banks in distress not only enhances the 
credibility of non-insurance of some creditors. It also allows for predictability of 
distress resolution costs for shareholders and management of banks. It was 
argued above that such costs—if predictable—reduce the moral hazard incen- 
tives caused by deposit insurance schemes. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The New Capital Accord proposed by the Basel Committee (Basel II) is 
intended to make banks more sensitive to the riskiness of loans by allowing 
‘‘sophisticated’’ banks to use their internal ratings systems for the assignment of 
risk weights. In the short run the Basel II proposal is likely to partially achieve 
its objective by inducing banks to develop state of the art risk evaluation 
systems. The success is bound to be short lived, however, because Basel II 
contains the seeds of its own failure over a longer time horizon. The need for 
‘‘supervisory discretion’’ to implement the complex rules for using banks’ inter- 
nal risk scoring models, and the deep involvement of supervisors in the process 
4 The first statement of the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (1998) calls 
for the specification of ex ante insolvency or distress resolution procedures for banks. 
  
  
 
 
of validation and implementation of these models, create incentives for super- 
visors to become more rather than less tolerant of underestimation of credit risk. 
‘‘Regulatory capture’’ is an almost inevitable consequence of Basel II in many 
countries, and the increased political responsibility for the health of major banks 
creates incentives for regulatory forbearance and bail-outs. 
Two approaches are available to strengthen Basel II. First, market discipline 
could be enhanced by a mandatory subordinated debt requirement. Second, the 
specification of distress resolution procedures for banks imposing predictable 
costs on banks’ shareholders, management, and non-insured creditors would 
reduce banks’ incentives to shift risk to creditors and governments. Such pro- 
cedures are probably required to make a subordinated debt requirement effec- 
tive with respect to market discipline as well. Thus, the two approaches are 
complementary rather than substitutes. 
A final observation is that if market discipline is strengthened successfully and 
distress resolution costs are made predictable, then there is no need for a Pillar 1 
with detailed rules for the determination of risk weights for different kinds of 
loans. Under these conditions banks have incentives to use their best available 
information to determine the economically efficient sources of funding of assets 
with different risk. 
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